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Is There a Crisis of Political Participation?




There appears to be a crisis of political participation in Britain. Turnout at the
last UK general election was, at 58 per cent, lower than at any other general
election since 1918. Moreover, voters have been reluctant to go to the polls in
every other kind of election held over the last six years. Unsurprisingly, then,
politicians of all political persuasions have been asking themselves how they
can ‘re-engage’ the public with the political process.
This decline in electoral participation might seem particularly surprising given
one of the key social changes to have occurred in Britain over the last two 
decades – the expansion of educational attainment. Education is supposedly a
‘democratic good’, meant to encourage adherence to democratic values, a sense
of political competence and thus a greater propensity to vote (Almond and
Verba, 1963; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). As Almond and Verba’s study
of The Civic Culture put it:
The educated classes possess the keys to political participation and 
involvement while those with less education are less well equipped.
As Table 5.1 shows, in the mid-1980s nearly half the adult British population 
had no educational qualifications. Now, less than a quarter are in this position. 
Over the same period, the proportion with a degree has more than doubled (to
16 per cent), while those with at least an A level or its equivalent now comprise
well over two-fifths of the adult population (rather than just over a quarter as 
they did two decades ago). So Britain has experienced a substantial increase in 
overall levels of educational attainment, something we might expect to produce 
an increase in electoral participation. That the very opposite seems to have
happened is nothing less than a ‘puzzle of participation’ (Brody, 1978).
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Table 5.1 Highest educational qualification reached, 1986–2002
1986 1989 1991 1994 1998 2000 2002 Change
‘86-‘02
% % % % % % %
Degree 7 7 9 10 9 14 16 +9
A-level /
other HE 21 24 25 26 30 26 29 +8
None 45 42 38 35 30 29 23 -22
Base 3100 3029 2918 3469 3146 3426 3425
Of  course, voting is not the only form of political participation open to 
individuals in a liberal democracy. They can also, for example, sign a petition, 
contact the media or go on a demonstration. Recent events, such as the fuel
protests in September 2000, marches against the banning of fox hunting, and 
anti-war demonstrations prior to the onset of the Iraqi war in March 2003, have
suggested that perhaps there is no puzzle of participation after all. Perhaps a 
better-educated and more politically competent society is more willing and able 
to participate in a range of political activities, activities that are seen as a more 
effective way of expressing one’s view than simply putting a cross on a ballot
paper (Inglehart, 1997).
However, if this is the case, then it raises different concerns about recent
trends in participation in Britain. There is plenty of evidence that those who
take  part in non-electoral forms of political participation tend to be drawn
disproportionately from the ranks of the better educated (Marsh, 1977; Marsh
and Kaase, 1979; Heath and Topf, 1987; Parry et al., 1992; Norris, 2002).1
Consequently, if such non-electoral participation is becoming relatively more 
important, we might find growing social divisions in Britain between those who
do and do not participate. Moreover, some argue that rising educational 
standards will   mean that those without any qualifications will find it 
increasingly difficult to compete in the political market place (Dalton, 2002). If
this is true, we should expect to find our divide widening still further. So
perhaps we need to be concerned about a growing participation divide in Britain
between, on the one hand, a group of well-educated ‘super-activists’ who are
able and willing to engage in range of political activities, and, on the other, a
substantial if diminishing group of the less well educated who are effectively
excluded from the avenues of political participation.
These are the questions examined in this chapter. We begin by considering 
how it might have been possible for electoral turnout to have fallen despite 
rising levels of educational attainment. We then examine whether levels of non-
electoral participation have indeed increased over the last twenty years. And,
finally, we consider whether there is any evidence that education has come to 
matter more in determining who participates. In so doing, we are not aiming to
provide a full account of the recent decline in electoral turnout (see Bromley
and Curtice, 2002), or to explain why people protest (Marsh, 1977; Barnes and 
Kaase, 1979; Parry et al., 1992). Rather, we seek to examine what impact, if 
any, one of the major changes of the last twenty years has had on patterns of
political participation.
Personal efficacy
One key assumption underpins the proposition that rising educational levels 
should result in higher levels of participation. This is that higher levels of
educational attainment bring with them a stronger sense of ‘subjective’ political
competence. By this, we mean the sense that one has the ability and confidence 
to take political actions that could be effective  in changing a government 
decision. So we begin by considering whether education does bring with it a 
sense of personal political efficacy. We then examine what impact rising
educational levels have had on overall levels of efficacy.
As the next table shows, those with no educational attainment certainly are less
likely than the better educated to feel personally efficacious. Those with no
qualifications are currently twice as likely as those with a degree to agree 
strongly with the view “people like me have no say in what the government
does”, and are no less than eight times more  likely to  agree strongly that
“sometimes government and politics seem so complicated that a person like me 
cannot really understand what is going on”. Moreover, while these differences
have fluctuated somewhat from year to year, there is no evidence that the gap
between the most and least well educated has consistently become any narrower
in more recent years. So the reasoning behind Almond and Verba’s claim that 
the educated possess the ‘keys to political participation’ appears to remain as
valid as it has ever been.2
However, the next table also tells us something else equally important. This is
that the rise in educational attainment over the last twenty years has not been 
accompanied by any systematic long-term increase in personal efficacy. The 
proportion who strongly agree that politics and government seem complicated is
just as high now as it was in the 1980s, while the proportion who believe they
have no say in what the government does is if anything higher now.
So, while at any one point in time higher levels of educational attainment are 
associated with a stronger sense of political efficacy, it is not the case that the
increase  in educational attainment has resulted in more people feeling 
efficacious. The impact of the increase in educational attainment has in fact 
been wholly negated by changes in the level of personal efficacy within our
educational groups, changes that are perhaps a response to the drop that has
occurred in the extent to which people believe the political system is able and 
willing to respond to demands for change that may be made of it (Curtice and
Jowell, 1997: 153; Bromley et al., 2001; Bromley and Curtice, 2002).3  And
while none of this on its own points to any kind of crisis of participation, we can
at least begin to see why a rise in educational attainment may not be sufficient
to bring about a more participatory culture.
% strongly agree
People like me have no say
1986 1987 1991 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
All* 23 14 16 28 24 17 25 26
Education level
Degree** 14 3 7 18 9 10 17 16
No qualifications*** 26 20 21 30 32 24 28 32
% strongly agree
Politics and government so 
complicated that a person like
me cannot really understan
All
d
17 13 16 22 22 15 18 17
Education level
Degree 4 2 4 3 6 4 3 4
No qualifications 23 18 26 31 35 32 25 32
*Base 1548 3414 1445 1137 1180 2071 2293 2287
**Base 113 284 112 110 124 179 300 342
***Base 689 1342 576 458 406 654 740 609
Table 5.2 Trends in personal efficacy and education level, 1986–2002
in what government does
Source: 1987: British Election Study
Electoral participation
But does how efficacious someone feels make any difference to whether or not
they vote in the first place? Table 5.3 suggests that those who feel personally
efficacious are somewhat more likely to vote (Parry et al., 1992; Pattie and
Johnston, 1998). Thus, among those who disagree with the statement “people
like me have no say in what the government does” (and who therefore can be 
seen as having high levels of political efficacy), nearly three-quarters reported 
voting in the 2001 election, compared with fewer than six in ten among those
who agreed strongly with the statement. But the strength of this link seems to
vary from election to election, and indeed is never particularly strong. This may
help explain why sometimes researchers have doubted whether any link exists
at all (Heath and Taylor, 1999; Pattie and Johnston, 2001). Our findings suggest
that, although a link exists, it is only amongst the minority with the lowest 
possible levels of personal efficacy that turnout is noticeably different from the 
norm. We should remember too that in 1997, and again in 2001, turnout fell 
across the board, quite irrespective of how efficacious someone felt. So the
level of turnout can certainly change irrespective of trends in levels of personal
efficacy.
1987 Base 1997 Base 2001 Base
Agree strongly 85 491 75 374 57 242
Agree 86 1149 80 1033 69 480
Neither agree nor disagree 88 537 78 488 66 118
Disagree/disagree strongly 88 1191 84 518 72 254
Table 5.3 Voting and personal efficacy, 1987–2001
People like me have no say in 
what the government does
% voted
Sources: 1987 and 1997: British Election Study
Given this, it is not surprising to find that in Britain, as in much of the rest of 
Europe (but not in the United States), there is little relationship between 
educational attainment and turnout (Heath and Topf, 1986; Parry et al., 1992; 
Pattie and Johnston, 1998, 2001; Topf, 1999a). As the next table shows, among
those with no educational qualifications the level of reported turnout in the 2001
election was just five points lower than it was among those with a degree. A 
similar pattern has applied to each election over the last two decades. In short,
there is no reason to expect that an increase in educational attainment should
have much impact on the level of turnout one way or another.
Table 5.4 Turnout and education level, 1987–2001
% voted
Education level 1987 1992 1997 2001
Degree 87 93 82 77
Base 305 255 301 497
No qualifications 85 85 79 72
Base 1560 1263 908 899
Source: 1987 and 1997: British Election Study
Still, we might ask why this should be the case, given the lower level of 
personal efficacy that exists amongst those with no educational qualifications?
One of the key explanations that has been offered is that trade unions in Britain
(as in much of the rest of Europe) have been able to mobilise the less well
educated and persuade them of the merits of going to the polling station. This, it 
is argued, distinguishes Britain from the United States, which has both a weaker
trade union movement and a more pronounced gap in turnout between more and
less well-educated groups (Dalton, 2002: 54).4 However, if this were the case,
we might have anticipated an educational divide in levels of turnout to have
opened up over the last twenty years as trade unions have declined.
In fact, there is little to substantiate this theory. As the next table shows, over 
the last twenty years, trade union membership has consistently been higher
among the better educated than among the less well educated. And, at the same
time, the decline in membership has occurred at more or less the same rate
among all educational groups. So there is no reason here to anticipate that the 
decline in trade in union membership should have opened up an educational
divide in electoral participation.
Table 5.5 Trade union membership by education level, 1986–2002
% belong to a trade union
1986 1991 1994 1998 2002
All 24 21 22 19 18
Base
Highest education level
3100 2918 3469 3146 3435
Degree/other HE 32 28 32 27 24
Base 576 666 759 870 1015
A level 26 22 22 22 18
Base 266 280 419 311 440
O level/CSE/GCSE 23 20 20 16 14
Base 829 783 925 888 979
None 21 17 18 13 12
Base 1392 1134 1300 1009 895
So perhaps we should stop looking for explanations as to why education makes
no difference to turnout and instead accept that, in Britain at least, voting is not
after all that demanding an act, and is certainly one that the less well educated 
can undertake perfectly well. However, if we accept this line of argument, it not
only means that rising levels of educational attainment are no guarantee of
higher turnout, but that they are also little defence either against other forces 
that might discourage electoral participation (Heath and Taylor, 1999; Bromley
and Curtice, 2002; Franklin, 2002). And, if this is so, one may question how far
innovations such as the inclusion of classes in civic education on the English
national curriculum can be expected to increase turnout either.
Non-electoral participation
The picture is, however, very different once we move beyond the ballot box and
look at trends in non-electoral participation. The next table shows, using our
2002  survey, the proportion of those with a degree and those with no 
qualifications who report ever having done each of eleven possible actions that
might  be undertaken by someone in response to a government action they
believe is unjust and harmful (or in the case of stopping buying goods as a way 
of protesting against something a country or company has done). Graduates are 
far more likely than those without qualifications to have undertaken each of the
activities. In fact, among those with no qualifications, few report ever having
done anything other than sign a petition or boycott something in the shops.
5.6 Non-electoral participation by educational attainment
% saying they had Education level





Signed a petition 60 26
Given money to a campaigning organisation 34 7
Gone on a protest or demonstration 31 6
Contacted MP 29 9
Got involved in a campaigning organisation 29 8
Raised the issue in an organisation they 
already belong to 17 2
Contacted government department 12 2
Contacted the media 11 4
Spoken to an influential person 11 3
Formed a group of like-minded people 4 1
Base 342 609
So, once we move beyond the ballot box, educational attainment does make a 
considerable difference to the likelihood that someone will ever be involved in 
political activity. But why is this so? Is it, as Almond and Verba would suggest,
simply because these groups are more efficacious? After all, whatever may be
true about voting, virtually all other forms of political action are sufficiently
demanding to require a degree of confidence in one’s ability. Or is the process 
more complex than this? Inglehart’s theory of cognitive mobilisation suggests 
that rising educational standards tend not only to increase people’s sense of
their  own political abilities, but also to lower their regard for the political 
system itself, and in particular for ‘hierarchical political institutions’ (Inglehart,
1997). As a result, they have a greater motivation to engage in protest activities,
as well as the confidence to do so. Similarly, Marsh has argued that the most 
politically active people are those who are both personally efficacious and 
disinclined to trust governments to do what is right. These ‘efficacious cynics’, 
he claims, believe in their own ability to effect change, but also “feel that
politics is far too important to be left solely to the politicians, most of whom
they actually mistrust” (Marsh, 1977: 123).
In practice, the simpler explanation proves to be the more convincing (see also
(Parry et al., 1992; Curtice and Jowell, 1997). The next table uses the same 
information as Table 5.6 but shows the average number of actions reported 
(excluding boycotting products as this is not an action directed at a domestic 
government) broken down by respondents’ political efficacy and levels of trust
in government. Efficacy clearly matters. Someone who strongly disagrees with
the view that politics is too complicated to understand (and who is thus very
efficacious) has, on average, undertaken nearly three activities, a sharp contrast
to the figure of 0.8 actions undertaken by someone with the lowest level of
efficacy. But these figures are not higher if people have low levels of trust in
government – indeed for the most part they are slightly lower. In so far as it 
matters at all, it seems that, far from giving people the motivation to become
involved politically, lack of trust promotes the feeling that getting involved is
unlikely to be worth the effort.
Table 5.7 Non-electoral participation by personal efficacy and trust in government
Mean no. of actions taken Trust governments to place the needs of the 
nation above party interest
Politics and government so 





Base Some of the time/
almost never
Base
Strongly agree 0.8 73 0.8 339
Agree 1.3 230 1.0 768
Neither agree nor disagree 1.3 59 1.2 158
Disagree 1.9 163 1.9 322
Strongly disagree 3.0 38 2.8 78
But what has happened to levels of non-electoral participation over the last 
twenty years? Has it increased in line with the rise in educational attainment?
Or has it been held back by the failure of personal efficacy to increase during
that period? Is non-electoral participation perhaps becoming a substitute for the
ballot box? Or is the decline in electoral turnout part of a wider decline in
political participation and engagement?
We have two sets of measures we can use to examine these questions. For
most of the activities listed in Table 5.6 we have data going back twenty years. 
This shows both the extent to which people would take a particular action if “a
law was being considered by parliament which you thought was really unjust 
and harmful”, and the extent to which people had ever done so. So the first of
these measures is an indication of apparent inclination or potential to engage in 
non-electoral protest activity; the second, an indication of the degree to which
that potential has been realised in practice.
We begin with our measure of inclination or potential. The next table shows 
the proportion who said they would do each thing were an unjust or harmful law
being considered by parliament. We also show a summary of the total number
of things people said they would do.
Table 5.8 Trends in potential non-electoral participation, 1983–2002
% saying they 
would
1983  1986  1989  1991  1994  1998  2000  2002  Change
’83–’02
Sign a petition 55 65 71 78 68 67 68 63 +8
Contact MP 46 52 55 49 58 59 49 51 +5
Contact media 14 15 14 14 22 21 22 27 +13
Go on protest or
demonstration 8 11 14 14 17 21 16 18 +10
Speak to an
influential person 10 15 15 17 15 18 17 19 +9
Form a group of
like-minded people 6 8 19 7 10 9 7 8 +2




9 10 11 9 7 9 10 11 +2
No. of actions
None 12 10 8 6 7 7 7 7 - 5
One or two 72 65 61 64 58 54 59 58 - 14
Three or more 14 25 30 29 33 37 32 33 + 19
Base 1761 1548 1516 1445 1137 2030 2293 2287
As the last column of table 5.8 shows, in every case, more people say they
would take a particular action now than said they would twenty years ago. 
Particularly noteworthy is a near doubling in the proportion who say they would
contact the media (a reflection perhaps of the recent growth in opportunities for
‘ordinary people’ to get their views across to the media). True, the growth in 
reported willingness to take action has not followed a simple linear trend. Much
of the increase happened in the 1980s (a period in which rising levels of 
educational attainment were not being counteracted by falling levels of personal
efficacy). But at least some of the dividend that might have been expected from
the rise in educational attainment appears to have been reaped.
Has this growth in protest potential been realised in action? Table 5.9 suggests
it has. In six of the seven actions listed in the table, more people now report
having done them than was the case in 1986. However, the increases are mostly
small and, as we saw earlier, many of them largely occurred in the 1980s.
Table 5.9 Trends in actual non-electoral participation, 1986–2002
% saying they had 1986 1989 1991 1994 2000 2002 Change
1986-
2002
Signed a petition 34 41 53 39 42 43 +9
Contacted MP 11 15 17 14 16 17 +6
Contacted media 3 4 4 5 6 7 +4
Gone on a protest or 
demonstration 6 8 9 9 10 12 +6
Spoken to an 
influential person 3 3 5 3 4 6 +3
Formed a group of 
like-minded people 2 3 2 3 2 2 0
Raised the issue in
an organisation they 5 4 5 4 5 6 +1
already belong to
No. of actions
None 56 48 37 53 47 46 -10
One or two 38 43 53 38 43 42 +4
Three or more 5 7 8 8 9 11 +6
Base
1548 1516 1445 1137 2293 2287
Moreover, apart from the relatively undemanding activity of signing a petition,
most people have not engaged in these forms of protest activities most of the
time.5 Still, it is quite clear that the decline in turnout at recent British elections 
is not part of any wider refusal by the public to become involved in the political
process. Rather, it seems that other forms of political participation are now
somewhat more common than they once were.
This coincidence of a decline in electoral participation and an increase in non-
electoral participation obviously raises questions as to whether the two are 
connected. Is the latter, perhaps, replacing the former? Are some turning away
from the ballot box and demonstrating on the street instead? In truth, there is no
evidence to support this. Rather, those who do take part in non-electoral 
political activities are actually more rather than less likely to vote in elections.
In our 2002 survey, as many as 80 per cent of those who had undertaken three
or more protest actions said they had voted in the previous general election, 
compared with just 65 per cent of those who had not engaged in any actions.
The same finding applies among younger people, the group for whom the claim 
that non-electoral activity is a substitute for electoral activity is most common. 
So, among those aged under 35 who had never undertaken any form of non-
electoral activity, reported turnout was 46 per cent; among  those who had 
undertaken three or more, turnout was reported at 58 per cent. Consequently,
non-electoral participation should be seen as an add-on to voting, and not as a 
substitute (Marsh, 1977; Bromley et al., 2001).
What, however, we can also note from Tables 5.8 and 5.9 could be happening
is that a new breed of ‘super-activists’ is emerging who engage in a much wider
range of non-electoral activities than was commonly the case in the past. 
Certainly, the proportion of people who say they have undertaken three or more
actions has  more than doubled since 1986. Is this perhaps a sign that the
education divide in non-electoral participation is widening, and that Britain now
has an educated elite that is becoming even more active while perhaps those
with no qualifications are being left behind?
It seems not. In Table 5.10, we show the number of actions reported by those 
with degrees and those with no qualifications on a number of occasions over the
last two decades. We also show the ‘education gap’, which  is simply the
difference between the proportion of those with a degree reporting having
undertaken three or more activities and the proportion of those with no
qualifications doing so. This education gap proves to be largely the same in
most years and certainly shows no evidence of a trend over time. So while non-
electoral participation is far higher amongst the better educated, this is no more
the case now than it was twenty years ago.
Table 5.10  Trends in number of actual non-electoral activities undertaken
by education level, 1986–2002
No. of protest activities 
undertaken by…
1986 1989 1991 1994 2000 2002
… people with a degree
None 28 28 22 23 26 27
One or two 47 34 56 54 49 48
Three or more 22 35 22 23 25 26
Base 113 88 141 110 300 342
… people with no qualifications
None 62 58 49 69 58 63
One or two 34 37 46 27 38 34
Three or more 2 3 3 3 4 3
Base 689 622 593 458 740 609
Education gap +20 +32 +19 +20 +21 +23
At the same time Table 5.10 also shows that the levels of participation within 
the two groups has not varied a great deal either. This suggests that the rise in 
non-electoral participation over the last two decades has been no less – but also
no more – than we might have expected given the increase in educational
attainment and the strength of the relationship between educational attainment
and non-electoral participation. In fact, participation levels are somewhat higher
now than they were in 1986 in some of the intermediate educational groups not
shown in Table 5.10. So in truth, modest though it has been, the rise in non-
electoral participation has been somewhat greater than accounted for by the rise
in educational attainment alone. Evidently it is a mistake to believe that the rise 
in educational attainment has been sufficient to transform the pattern of non-
electoral participation.
Conclusions
We began this chapter with a crisis and a puzzle. Britain appeared to be 
suffering a crisis of political participation and this appeared to be a puzzle given
the expansion that has occurred in educational attainment over the last twenty
years. Yet it seems that we have neither a crisis nor a puzzle. True, electoral
participation may have fallen, but it has been accompanied by an increase in
non-electoral participation, an increase that cannot itself be regarded as the
cause of the decline in turnout. So the participation crisis in Britain is confined
to the ballot box, and it is not part of a wider decline in the willingness of
citizens to engage with the political system.
These divergent trends are perfectly compatible with the increase in levels of 
educational attainment that has occurred over the last twenty years. Educational 
attainment has never had, and continues not to have, much influence on 
electoral participation and so its expansion cannot be expected to insulate levels
of turnout against whatever other forces that may be helping to depress them.
On the other hand, education has always been associated with non-electoral
participation, levels of which have duly risen by more or less the (modest)
amount that we would expect given the extent of the rise in educational
attainment.
What messages do our findings tell us about how levels of political 
participation in Britain might change over the next twenty years, particularly as
the proportion of adults with educational qualifications continues to rise? One
possible danger, that the less well educated will become increasingly politically
marginalised, is not perhaps as great as we might have feared. Their relative
chances of being involved in politics outside the ballot box do not seem to show
any signs of becoming any lower than they are already. But, even so, voting
remains the only form of political activity where levels of participation between
groups from different educational backgrounds approach equity. So, if voting
continues its recent decline, and non-electoral participation its increase, then
there is an increased danger that the voices of the less well educated will
become quieter still.
Certainly, a further rise in non-electoral participation seems quite likely, 
although in part this depends on there not being a decline in levels of personal 
efficacy. And a better-educated public would seem more likely to engage with 
the increasing attempts being made by government to consult with the public in
the formulation of public policy. But, even so, and even amongst graduates,
most forms of political activity are the preserve of a small minority, and are
likely to remain so in the near future. Britain may become more like a 
participatory democracy in future, but most people, for most of the time, will 
still be relying on their elected representatives to make the right decision for
them.
Notes
1. However, in contrast, Topf has argued that the relationship between education and 
protest may be weakening. Across west European countries, he reports a steady 
“de-skilling of political activism”, as more and more people with low educational 
levels become involved in some form of protest activity (Topf, 1999b).
2. In addition to the trends shown in the table it should also be noted that there has 
been a decline in personal efficacy amongst all those whose level of educational 
attainment lies in-between that of the two groups shown in the table.
3. There is no evidence in our data to support the claim by Parry et al. (1992) that it is 
those with middle level qualifications that have the highest level of efficacy. For 
example, the proportion of those whose highest educational qualification is an ‘A’
level (or its equivalent) who strongly agree that “people like me have no say in
what government does” is, at 23 per cent, in-between the equivalent figure for those 
with a degree and those with no qualifications at all.
4. The decline in mobilising agencies such as trade unions is also often used to 
explain why, in the United States in particular, voter turnout has declined in spite of 
increases in educational attainment (Inglehart, 1990).
5. However, no less than 50 per cent say they have stopped buying goods in protest
against the actions of a particular company or country.
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